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A New Rootedness? Education in the Technological Age
Simon Glendinning1
 The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This paper explores the challenges facing educators in a time when modern
technology, and especially modern social technology, has an increasingly powerful hold on
our lives. The educational challenge does not primarily concern questions concerning the
use of technology in the classroom, or as part of the learning environment, but a chan-
geover in the whole social environment that marks our time. Taking guidance from Hei-
degger, Wittgenstein, Dewey and Nietzsche, the essay explores what we want the
education of children to achieve, and how, if at all, this can be achieved in an age of
modern social technology. The central argument is that the most basic educational goal of
human flourishing cannot be achieved today as long as the main criteria of ‘‘best practice’’
in the classroom foreground pupil enjoyment rather than endurance of suffering. The
paradox is that any call for the latter is now largely heard in a way cultivated by the culture
of the former: namely, poorly and vulgarly, associated only with bullying authoritarianism,
rather than the devoted care of teachers who want to awaken their pupils to self-
responsibility.
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Introduction
There is little doubt that European societies have undergone a profound transformation in
the last two-hundred years: from the self-sufficient farm economies of pre-industrial times,
through a period of intense industrialisation and urbanisation, and now the globalisation of
tele-technology and trans-national capitalism. In the course of these developments
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educational regimes have undergone related changes: from the rote schools, through the
progressive movement, and into our own performance focussed approaches in mass edu-
cation. How should we think through questions concerning the goal of education in our
time? This essay considers contributions to this issue from four thinkers who I regard as
most alive to the changes taking place in our time: Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Dewey and
Nietzsche. Two interrelated themes are highlighted. The first, concerns the goal of edu-
cation; the second concerns the characterisation of our time. The essay answers the first
question in terms of human flourishing in a place; and the second in terms of the ubiquity
of modern social technology. These answers speak to a distinctive and new social condi-
tion: the integration of powerfully de-localising, dis-placing technological devices into
traditionally localised forms of life, rooted in a place. The challenge for educators in this
tensional situation is how, if at all, the basic goal of education might still be attained: of
whether a new rootedness might be cultivated, even in the technological age.
Anticipating developments that are still underway, Martin Heidegger invited his audi-
ence at a memorial address delivered in his hometown of Meskirch in 1955 to ‘‘dwell upon
that which concerns us, each one of us, here, on this patch of home ground, and now, in the
present hour of history’’ (Heidegger 1959, p. 47). Heidegger thinks that the ‘‘now’’ of our
present hour of history is marked precisely by a distinctive loss of rootedness, the accel-
erating deracination of our lives from any ‘‘patch of home ground’’, an uprooting from any
definite ‘‘here’’ by new forms of social technology. In this essay I will try to introduce the
problem this new social condition raises with respect to the education of children in our
time. Going beyond any atavistic nostalgia for the old nativism—where education prepared
children for life as a ‘‘native’’ of a hometown or country, rooted in the milieu of a regional
or national community—I will argue that we are not seeing a transition from rootedness to
rootlessness, but a transition within a general space of nativisation, and the emergence of
what I will call (taking a word from digital-marketing professionals) ‘‘digital natives’’ The
implications of this transition for the education of children today are introduced and briefly
considered.
The Technological Age
‘‘What really is happening in our age?’’ asks Heidegger. He articulates the change he sees
underway in terms of what he calls ‘‘a revolution in leading concepts’’ (Heidegger 1959,
p. 50). The idea here is of a revolution in the most basic concepts through which and in
terms of which we understand the world and the significance of our lives; the concepts
which are fundamental to the pre-theoretical ‘‘understanding of Being’’ that has come
down to us. It is a changeover from a conceptual formation that he regards as ‘‘traditional’’
to one that he calls ‘‘technological’’.
This revolution ‘‘developed in the seventeenth century first and only in Europe’’; but
today, Heidegger suggests, it has grown worldwide and now ‘‘rules the whole earth’’
(Heidegger 1959, p. 50). And this revolution, the most fundamental revolution inside what
we perhaps too casually call ‘‘the industrial revolution’’, is not over. Even now something
newly new is just ‘‘beginning’’:
What we know now as the technology of film and television, of transportation and
especially air transportation, of news reporting, and as medical and nutritional
technology, is presumably only a crude start. No one can foresee the radical changes
to come. But technological advance will move faster and faster and can never be
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stopped. In all areas of his existence, man will be encircled ever more tightly by the
forces of technology. (Heidegger 1959, p. 51)
Heidegger’s view of the history of (globalising) Europe is that it is characterised from its
inception in classical Greek antiquity by the growth of a world-understanding which
encourages and sustains a distinctively objective and scientific interest in everything that is,
with the disclosed world understood increasingly as ‘‘the natural world’’ and ourselves as
‘‘natural creatures’’. Hand-in-hand with this world-historical development is the growing
prevalence of a ‘‘technological’’ mode of revealing everything that is. The point here is not
simply that science delivers technological advances and new technological devices, but
that scientific practice, and our thinking more generally, gets caught up in a world-
understanding which takes measurability, calculability and orderability (under orders, at
our disposal) as criteria for the ‘‘objectively real’’. This prevailing pre-reflective and pre-
theoretical orientation drives us towards ways of revealing reality that Heidegger calls
technological. And, in this prevailing set-up, the world-understanding that belonged to ‘‘the
old rootedness’’—to ways of living that had flourished on some ‘‘patch of home ground’’—
‘‘is being lost’’ (Heidegger 1959, p. 55).
The language of roots and soil—and a corresponding anxiety regarding up-rootedness
and deracination in the technological age—dominates Heidegger’s reflections. He quotes
the poet Johann Peter Hebel approvingly: ‘‘We are plants’’ (Heidegger 1959, p. 47). I will
try to graft a Derridean variant onto this fertile metaphor towards the end of the essay, but
we should be prepared already to guard against Heidegger’s pathos-filled investments in it.
What Heidegger picks up on in the movement of history into our time is the way the
globalising technological age transforms the conditions in which the ‘‘plant’’ human being
had creatively flourished hitherto. The problem is that Heidegger’s conception of the new
condition is freighted by his nativist (and insistently anti-Judaic) investments, figuring it as
homeless, rootless and worldless (he suggests, for example, that ‘‘movies…give the illu-
sion of a world that is no world’’ (Heidegger 1959, p. 48)). ‘‘Home’’, for Heidegger, is
always a ‘‘native home’’, a ‘‘hometown’’ in a ‘‘homeland’’, a people and a land, settled in a
place, a ‘‘patch of home ground’’ where alone the plants that we are can flourish.
Flourishing, I want to say with Heidegger, does presuppose some kind of milieu which
provides what Derrida calls a certain ‘‘racinating function’’ (Derrida 1976, p. 101). Hei-
degger’s affirmations of the flowering made possible in the old rootedness are certainly
continuous with his problematic investments. However, what we need to take our leave
from is less the idea of (let’s call it) ‘‘nativisation’’ as such, but the disastrous temptation to
represent that in exclusively ‘‘blood and soil’’ terms. Against Heidegger, I will want to
affirm another nativisation—the being-at-home of a more cosmopolitan plant—that
belongs, as Nietzsche stressed, to a human being who has achieved ‘‘independence of any
definite milieu’’ (Nietzsche 1973, p. 153). I will describe this in terms of the new root-
edness of ‘‘digital natives’’, and the problem of education in an age in which the old
rootedness is being lost concerns, especially, them.
How should we respond to the call to think on this topic? What if thinking too is, today,
increasingly caught up in the vortex of the technological revolution in basic concepts?
Heidegger thinks it is. Corresponding to his distinction between traditional and techno-
logical relations to the world and nature, Heidegger distinguishes between ‘‘meditative’’
and ‘‘calculative’’ thinking (Heidegger 1959, p. 47). While the former ‘‘dwells on what lies
close, and meditates on what lies closest’’, the latter is bent on endlessly constructing ‘‘far-
reaching plans’’ with ‘‘definite results’’, ‘‘computing’’ ever more efficient ‘‘solutions’’,
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‘‘organization’’ and ‘‘automation’’ in a domain of ‘‘given’’ possibilities and conditions
(Heidegger 1959, p. 46).
One fruitful line of engagement with Heidegger’s ideas here would be to underline the
extent to which public policy in education today is increasingly dominated by this kind of
calculative thinking. Such planning and organising in education belongs deep inside the
more general ‘‘revolution in leading concepts’’ underway, and it seems to me undeniable
that the spiralling efforts to ‘‘manage’’ schools ever more efficiently leads only to its
further bureaucratisation and to endless administration. However, there is a risk that an
inquiry of that kind, fascinating though it would doubtless be, might recoil towards a pious
‘‘critique’’ of education management as such. In fact, that kind of one-sidedeness is exactly
what Heidegger urges us to avoid. Fully compatible with an approach which seeks to think
a mode of nativisation with(in) technology, Heidegger does not recommend that we
denounce or resist or reject technological and calculative thinking. Indeed, he insists that it
‘‘remains indispensable’’ (Heidegger 1959, p. 46). Equally, he insists too that ‘‘the
arrangements, devices, and machinery of technology are to a greater or lesser extent
indispensable…We depend on technical devices; they even challenge us to ever greater
advances’’ (Heidegger 1959, p. 55). So there is no nostalgic hope or suggestion from
Heidegger simply to return to the old world, still less a retreat into an exclusively medi-
tative mode in the face of the new (‘‘worldless’’) one. Nevertheless, Heidegger is con-
cerned, and I think rightly concerned, that the hegemonic character of calculative thinking
and planning in our time prevents us from thinking clearly about the goal of all this
planning in education: the cultivation of young plants.
Schools may ban the use of mobile devices but they are far from free of technological
thinking. Educators in the technological age are swamped by endless ‘‘new initiatives’’
for school governance in which we lurch from one ‘‘school plan’’ to another, one
‘‘attainment target’’ to another, one ‘‘assessment method’’ to another, one ‘‘performance
indicator’’ to another, and so on and on. I think there is no doubt that this frenzy of
planning has a singular ‘‘definite result’’ in view today too: namely, and precisely,
‘‘definite results’’. Results conceived in terms of measurable test scores and exam results
come to figure as the fundamental ‘‘goal’’ and measure of ‘‘success’’ of a school’s work.
In this school system many schools lag behind those assessed as ‘‘outstanding’’ on this
measure of ‘‘results’’. Is this what Heidegger had in view when he said, in a lecture for
science teachers that he delivered in the vocational school of the State Academy for the
Continuing Education of Teachers in 1962: ‘‘the whole school system…lags behind with
regard to the goal of its work in this age’’ (Heidegger 1998, p. 130)? Was Heidegger
concerned that the school system was altogether failing in its goal of delivering out-
standing results across the piece?
No, ‘‘the goal of its work in this age’’ has its stress on the new conditions of our time.
As he goes on to say: ‘‘It can be doubted whether the talk about the professional training
school, about general education, about education as a whole, still meets the circum-
stances that are formed by the technological age’’ (Heidegger 1998, p. 130). And the
goal of its work? Holding on to the poetic metaphor, I want to suggest that the goal of its
work is and remains what it has always been: to cultivate the young plant ‘‘human
being’’ so that it can flourish in its environment. Today we have the special question of
how to cultivate such a plant in an altogether different environment from the traditional
one, an environment in which the old rootedness is being lost, an environment which
might even seem no longer an environment, no longer a soil in which to take root. I want
now to turn to this question.
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The Progressive Legacy
Heidegger stresses how far developments in the school system lag behind in taking into
account the mutation in our time that concerns him. However, changes in the school system
were (as he indicates) certainly happening and, indeed, a transition from ‘‘traditional’’ to
‘‘modern’’ and ‘‘progressive’’ educational systems was well underway when he was
writing. Those changes were, in my view, profoundly caught up in the more general
cultural mutation in Europe’s industrial modernity that Heidegger attends to. This mutation
is not only associated with ideas of scientific and technological ‘‘progress’’, but also and
equally with a political transformation that Nietzsche summarised (‘‘without implying any
praise or blame’’) as ‘‘the democratic movement in Europe’’ (Nietzsche 1973, p. 153). As
John Dewey saw, this general cultural situation gives the developments in education
reform of this time a somewhat complex aspect, marked simultaneously by two contextual
tensional situations: the first relating to the general cultural transition from traditional to
scientific and democratic cultural ideals; the second relating to the transition from tradi-
tional to modern and progressive educational ideas (see Childs 1966, p. 61).
Traditional education for children in Europe (including, as Nietzsche put it, ‘‘the lands
where Europe’s influence predominates’’ (Nietzsche 1973, p. 106)) can be broadly char-
acterised in terms of a ‘‘rote school’’ or ‘‘three-Rs’’ system. Dewey’s basic claim is that the
tensional situation concerning the transition from this traditional school system towards a
more ‘‘modern’’ and ‘‘progressive’’ one must be seen in the light of a larger social situation
arising from European scientific and political modernity. School reform programmes nest
within a wider tensional situation in which ideas from experimental science and increas-
ingly democratic aspirations were transforming life quite generally. Educational reforms
underway in the course of the industrial revolution thus belong inside a transition from the
cultural reproduction of ‘‘the lore and wisdom’’ (Dewey 1938, p. 35) of the old ‘‘self-
sufficient farm economy’’ (Childs 1966, p. 61), towards a more scientific and technical
approach in a new industrial and increasingly urban life in parliamentary democracies.
Dewey’s commentary on the reform process represents the school situation as
embedded within the larger social situation of European modernity. And he clearly saw
that the programme of the rote school was ‘‘bound to disintegrate’’ under the impact of the
changing social situation (see Child 1966, p. 61). It is in this context that modern and
progressive movements in education emerged.
Dewey’s sense of the historical specificity of the progressive movement in education
gives his own reflections on educational reform a richness often lacking in merely theo-
retical discourses. Dewey is rightly regarded as a progressive reformer in educational
thinking. However, it is less frequently acknowledged that he refused to take sides in the
debate between ‘‘traditional’’ and ‘‘progressive’’ educational theories as these were being
practically developed. For Dewey, the merits of the latter lie in the way in which they
foreground (in theory) the role of education in fostering the expression and cultivation of
individuality. In the context of a newly democratic society, where each one counts one (and
hence where, for example, history teaching might aspire to be ‘‘history for all’’), Dewey
does not reject that ambition. However, as we shall see, he regards a central plank of the
progressive programme that was developing as fundamentally inimical to achieving any-
thing but a poor and vulgar variant of that democratic goal—or even to see it as democratic
progress in name only.
Dewey’s principle objection to the progressive philosophy he saw developing, and the
basis of his further doubts about it, is that it is essentially reactive. Its theory is constructed,
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that is to say, in simple negating opposition to traditional theory, rather than through the
development of a positive basic idea of its own. ‘‘Departure from the old solves no
problems’’, says Dewey, and while he welcomes the new stress on student ‘‘personal
experience’’, he is especially critical of the progressive aversion to a teacher’s ‘‘control’’
and ‘‘authority’’ in the classroom, and its correlative emphasis on wanting to make school
work enjoyable for children: ‘‘an experience may be immediately enjoyable and yet pro-
mote the formation of a slack and careless attitude’’ (Dewey 1938, p. 8). Progressives in
practice were, for Dewey, risking throwing the baby out with the bathwater in their drive
for their supposedly democratic reforms.
For Dewey, by contrast, the fault of the traditional approach was not that the authority
of the teacher was inappropriate or undeserved, or that children’s experiences in the
classroom were not enjoyable, but that it had become radically unsuited to what I am
calling the most basic educational goal: of forming human beings capable of flourishing
here and now. While it was (more or less) suited to preparing children for (a pretty
demanding and difficult) life in the old self-sufficient farm economy, the rote school is no
way to prepare them for life in the new (and in newly new ways demanding and difficult)
industrial society and a democratic age. Totally ‘‘foreign to the situations of life outside the
school’’ the traditional approach provided no ‘‘impetus to learn’’, and resulted only in
‘‘ennui and boredom’’ (Dewey 1938, p. 9).
Boring, unpleasant, and painful tasks are obviously not the thing. Nor is it a matter of
making education disagreeable—but for Dewey ‘‘enjoyment’’ and ‘‘agreeableness’’ are not
what matter either. What matters in an educational programme is how far it enables or
(conversely) closes down the possibilities of a child’s later life in society. What sort of
adult human being does it cultivate? Does it allow them to go forward on their own in new
situations, or does it have the effect of narrowing ‘‘the field of further experience’’ (Dewey
1938, p. 8)? The education should be humane, Dewey had no doubt about that. However, it
should not be bent on indulging the children’s ‘‘internal’’ conditions either. The over-
indulged child, Dewy insists, will become an adult quite unlike his parents, who had
received a completely different kind of education themselves. The over-indulged child will
be competent only to ‘‘do what he feels like doing’’ and to avoid all situations ‘‘which
require effort and perseverance in overcoming obstacles’’ (Dewy 1938, p. 14), Dewey is
particularly critical of short-sighted parents and progressive teachers who were then
‘‘acting upon the idea of subordinating objective conditions to internal ones, subordinating
everything in the school, that is, to the immediate inclinations and feeling of the young’’
(Dewey 1938, p. 16). Dewey would have recognised Wittgenstein’s concern when he
(Wittgenstein) later observed that this progressive tendency was becoming increasingly
matter of course in our time:
I think the way people are educated nowadays tends to diminish their capacity for
suffering. At present a school is reckoned good ‘‘if the children have a good time’’.
And that used not to be the criterion. Parents moreover want their children to grow
up like themselves (only more so), but nevertheless subject them to an education
quite different from their own.—Endurance of suffering isn’t rated highly because
there is supposed not to be any suffering—really it’s out of date. (Wittgenstein 1980,
p. 71)
Neither Dewey nor Wittgenstein is advocating corporal punishment, bullying, or punitive
teaching regimes. On the other hand, they look on with dismay at progressive opposition to
a certain kind of ‘‘endurance of suffering’’ that, in their view, should belong internally to
education as an experientially demanding process.
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History for All
It is perhaps a mark of how far the change in educational fashion has entered our thinking
that we (and I include myself here) hardly know what to make of the idea that developing
capacities for the ‘‘endurance of suffering’’ should be thought internal to ‘‘best practice’’ in
schools. That sounds, to our ears, positively sadistic.
To underline that point, and to see at the same time the acuity of Wittgenstein’s sense of
the changing educational culture, I want to quote some conclusions from a 2011 Ofsted
survey report, entitled ‘‘History for All’’ (Ofsted, 2011). The Ofsted report’s aim was to
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of history teaching in primary and secondary
schools in England. There is nothing outrageous in it, I simply want to foreground a
dimension of its assessment that has become, I think, matter of course for us: the emphasis
on children having enjoyable experiences in the classroom.
Here is a shredded citation of a sixty-seven page document, beginning with the second
paragraph of the Executive Summary of history teaching overall:
History was generally taught well and the subject was well led. Most pupils enjoyed
[their] lessons.
And the first of the ‘‘Key Findings’’:
In the schools visited history was generally a popular and successful subject, which
many pupils enjoyed.
The third point on teaching in Primary Schools:
Pupils’ attitudes to history were good or better in the schools visited. They enjoyed
their lessons, regarded history as fun.
In the fourth bullet point on the report of Key Stage 3 teaching rated ‘‘good’’, we are told:
Students enjoyed the subject
In the third point on teaching in Primary Schools thought excellent, the report says:
[The] outstanding teaching and learning in history…helps to explain…why many
pupils enjoy history.
The Report cites a school visit to a Secondary School highlighting:
Students enjoyed the lessons and the many opportunities they had to take part in
historical drama, debates and discussions.
With regard to the training of Secondary School history teachers, the Report emphasises
that one of the four most crucial factors in lessons that were considered ‘‘effective’’ was
that
the students’ attitudes were excellent, firmly rooted in the students’ confidence in the
teacher and their experience of enjoyable and worthwhile history.
On curriculum design the Report says that it should be ‘‘based on capturing pupils’
imaginations’’ and quotes her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Education, Children’s Services
and Skills warning that:
focusing too much on the three core subjects can have negative effects on the
curriculum in terms of breadth, balance and pupils’ enjoyment.
A New Rootedness? Education in the Technological Age
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Secondary Schools were encouraged to arrange for their students to attend regular sessions
at their local university. This would
develop their thinking in history through activities that were focused but also
enjoyable.
Well that’s enough of that. All this just to get a sense of what most makes sense to us about
teaching and learning today. Obviously that’s not all that makes sense to us: as we have
seen, it is clearly not the only criterion that matters, but it is nevertheless a key
consideration in our assessments of teaching that it can only be excellent when it is an
enjoyable experience for the children.
Wittgenstein as Teacher
Wittgenstein contrasted the kind of education had by parents who wanted something
entirely different for their children. Of course, the world of the parents and children had
changed too. And it is fascinating, I think, that when Wittgenstein reflected on the mutation
in the world that belongs to our time, his thoughts not only run close to Heidegger’s
considerations about technology, but turn in conclusion to the education and schooling of
children. Here is a recollected conversation between Wittgenstein and the American
philosopher O.K. Bouwsma from 1949 (just a year after his out-of-date remark):
He began remarking about the changes in our way of life since the days of his parents
in Vienna. ‘‘They would scarcely recognize this as the same world.’’ It is the
machines of course which are so obvious. But he had in mind certain changes in the
kind of human beings we are, incidental to all these changes in our surroundings.
There was a time in which our lives were furnished rather simply, a house, a place,
tools so many, a beast, and a circle of people. In this simplicity and this stability one
grew attached to a limited environment. This gave life a certain quality—roots. Now
not only are people transient, but neighbourhoods do not remain the same. We live in
surroundings to which we are not sentimentally attached. Most of what we use and
own can be replaced by something just as good. He had once heard John Dewey talk
about the kind of human being he wished by education to produce. ‘‘But I was a
human being which was fitted to the old environment.’’ How could he make such a
human being in an altogether different environment? (Bouwsma 1986, p. 39)
The fact that Wittgenstein heard a talk by Dewey at all is amazing. Bouwsma does not ask
him further about the event, but Dewey’s diary for 1942 records him looking forward to
going to ‘‘the Science Association meeting in Cambridge’’ in August that year (Martin
2002, p. 229). Unfortunately, there is no such association of that name which met in
Cambridge at that time. However, Wittgenstein’s biographer, Ray Monk, suggests that
Dewey may have been referring to the Association for the Advancement of Science, which
did meet there (personal communication). This seems very likely. For not only did that
Association hold its meetings in Cambridge, they held them at Trinity, Wittgenstein’s own
college. He must have seen a notice of it. But, surprising co-incidence apart, the fact that
Wittgenstein decided to attend the talk, and took a serious interest in what Dewey had to
say, is really not so surprising at all. From 1920 to 1926 Wittgenstein had himself been a
primary school teacher at three mountain village primary schools in Austria (in
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Trattenbach, Puchberg and Otterthal), and questions of teaching and learning—conceived
in terms of the inheritance of a culture and, especially, of a language—never left him. A
word or two on this will prove helpful.
Significantly, Wittgenstein’s time as a teacher coincided with the emergence of a
developing school reform movement in the new Austrian republic:
The school reformers, most of whom were socialists (Social Democrats), viewed the
changes in orientation as politically necessary to free the future farming and working
classes of the new republic from authoritarian attitudes towards learning and to fit
them to participate as citizens of a democracy, actively weighing issues and deciding
for themselves. (Bartley 1986, p. 80)
Wittgenstein was certainly not a signed-up supporter of every aspect of progressive
education. But his own style, for the most part, fitted well (or well enough to stand
assessment) with the aims of the Austrian school reform movement, in particular its
emphasis on active learning. With the children he taught he put together skeletons of
animals for use in elementary zoology; constructed models of steam-engines; made
pulleys, and other mechanical instruments. And it wasn’t all practical. He taught maths to a
far higher level than required, insisting that ‘‘one could never begin algebra early enough’’
(Bartley 1986, p. 100). Famously, he also made and published a dictionary which was
largely comprised of words entered by his pupils into word-books of their own.
Wittgenstein’s ambitions as a teacher were definitely aimed at their flourishing: the
(earthy) phrase he apparently used again and again when explaining his educational goals
was ‘‘to get the peasantry out of the muck’’ (Bartley 1986, p. 85).
Unfortunately, his efforts at the cultivation of the young flowers he was teaching, to help
them rise above the mucky ground, didn’t go down well with the adult peasantry at that
time, for whom education was little more than a diversion from the considerable demands
of ground dwelling. The farming heart of Austrian life outside Vienna had little need for
what Dewey called ‘‘the chief social instrumentality for forming a type of human
beings’’—especially not a type of human beings that could actually ‘‘mount from the depth
of his home ground up into the ether’’ (Heidegger 1959, p. 47). They had no interest to (as
Wittgenstein is understood to have aimed) ‘‘awaken them to the life of the spirit, to the
activity of thinking for themselves’’ (Bartley 1986, p. 101).
In making the dictionary Wittgenstein explicitly says that he was attempting to
‘‘awaken’’ an ‘‘orthographic conscience’’ in each of his pupils (Wittgenstein 1993, p. 19).
Teaching spelling should not, Wittgenstein stressed in his preface to the dictionary, be
interested in ‘‘average spelling’’ results: ‘‘It is not the class that should learn to spell but
each individual student,’’ and this requires that the individual student develops a strong
sense of responsibility for their own spelling (Wittgenstein 1993, p. 15). The educational
task is to cultivate such ‘‘awakening’’ in students. Indeed, the task here belongs to a
teaching practice which aimed, quite generally, to cultivate intense self-responsibility in
each individual student: ‘‘He should feel that he is the only author of his work and he alone
should be responsible for it’’ (Wittgenstein 1993, p. 15). In Wittgenstein’s view, as he
maintained throughout his work in philosophy, becoming someone with something to say,
and who can explain what they mean, is inseparable from the handing down to them the
use of words in a language, so that there is a deep connection between ‘‘the concept of
teaching and the concept of meaning’’ (Wittgenstein 1967, §412). And ‘‘teaching’’ here is
not simply instruction but training: ‘‘any explanation has its foundation in training’’, he
stressed, adding parenthetically ‘‘(Educators ought to remember this.)’’ (Wittgenstein
1967, §419). Who we become, the kind of human being we can be, is thus a profoundly
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intergenerational affair, a ‘‘handing down’’ in tradition, and has its foundation in a training
regime through which one acquires new possibilities of being and acting. When
Wittgenstein spoke of children being ‘‘trained’’ he was using this word, he said, ‘‘in a way
strictly analogous to the way in which we speak of an animal being trained’’ (Wittgenstein
1958, p. 77).
Wittgenstein was remembered as a demanding teacher by his pupils, on occasion
cuffing them too (something he felt terrible about later in his life), and generally expecting
complete honesty from them. This doesn’t help my case for seeing the interest in ‘‘en-
durance of suffering’’ as independent of attitudes verging on the sadistic. I will come back
to this, but we should bear in mind too that Wittgenstein’s pupils also remember him
showing ‘‘affection and tenderness’’ towards them (Bartley 1986, p. 89).
What kind of human being do we wish by education to produce? It is obviously some
kind of social instrumentality. But I think that we should distinguish a social instrumen-
tality in education which conceives it merely as an instrument in the service of the
reproduction of a given social order, and the idea of a social instrumentality in education
which finds in it the means to preserve the chance for every student ‘‘with a mind to do so’’
(Wittgenstein), ‘‘the impetus to learn’’ (Dewey), so that each may, ‘‘in his own manner and
within his own limits’’, ‘‘mount from the depth of his home ground up into the ether…into
the open realm of the spirit’’ (Heidegger). The latter idea, conceived in terms of an
awakening to self-responsibility, is, I believe, fundamental to the educational conception
championed by Dewey and Wittgenstein, and is nicely framed by Heidegger as follows:
The handing down in tradition is not a mere passing on, it is the preservation of what
is original, it is the safeguarding of the new possibilities of the already spoken
language…It [the language itself] lays claim to the human being to say the world
anew from the language that is preserved. (Heidegger 1998, p. 142)
Wittgenstein’s (perhaps Tolstoy-inspired) hope that he could go into the countryside to
educate the peasant youth failed, but it failed mainly because the adult peasantry did not
want their children freed for thinking, and ‘‘they eventually ran him out of town’’ (Bartley
1986, p. 85). Nevertheless, the simplicity and stability of life in a self-sufficient farming
economy was coming to an end in the age of technology. What is to be done in an age
when the old rootedness is being lost? The education of former times formed human beings
who were fitted for the old environment, and who could flourish there. Dewey and
Wittgenstein clearly regarded the progressive recoil from traditional education as utterly
inadequate to the goal of a schools work. It is simply not fit for anything but forming adults
capable of doing only what they feel like doing: ‘‘the promotion of a slack and careless
attitude’’. This is a very attenuated and hollowed out kind of ‘‘individual’’—someone who
basically only does what he or she is inclined to do. So this is the question: can we make
self-responsible human beings ‘‘capable of effort and perseverance in overcoming
obstacles’’—in an altogether different environment?
A New Nativisation
Heidegger had accepted that there was no question of abandoning technology, and he
correctly foresaw that our lives would be increasingly caught up with newly new delo-
calising devises and social technologies. Nevertheless, despite his disastrous political
investments, he remained open to the thought of creating a new ‘‘home ground’’ with
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technology, one that ‘‘might be fit to recapture the old and now rapidly disappearing
autochthony in a changed form’’ (Heidegger 1959, p. 55).
Suspending Heidegger’s political investments, perhaps we can construe the transition
effected by the industrial revolution in a somewhat different way than he did: not as a
transition from rootedness to rootlessness but as a transition within a general space of
nativisation. The ‘‘home ground’’ is not best conceived as the ‘‘native soil’’ in which the
creative work of spirit is rooted. Instead, we should think of the creative work as citing and
reciting other such works which it represents as the stabilising and nourishing ‘‘soil’’ in
which it is rooted—and as ‘‘other such works’’, their status is exactly the same too. Texts
bind themselves to texts; they hold tight to them, attach themselves to them, adhere and
circulate in them, sustain them as surviving still, and they do so within, as it were, a
soilless—let’s say virtual—space. In a passage which can be read as a commentary on
Heidegger’s representation of his rootedness in his ‘‘home soil’’, Derrida summarises this
unheard of (and, within the classical genealogical schema of ‘‘a work with its roots in a
soil’’ that Heidegger far too uncritically inherits, ‘‘forbidden’’) conception of racination in
Of Grammatology:
If a text always gives itself a certain representation of its own roots, those roots live
only by that representation, by never touching the soil, so to speak. Which
undoubtedly destroys their radical essence, but not the necessity of their racinating
function. To say that one always interweaves roots endlessly, bending them to send
down roots among the roots, to pass through the same points again, to redouble old
adherences, to circulate among their differences, to coil around themselves or to be
enveloped one in the other, to say that a text is never anything but a system of roots,
is undoubtedly to contradict at once the concept of system and the pattern of the root.
But…this [apparent] contradiction takes on the meaning of a contradiction, and
receives its ‘‘illogicality,’’ only through being thought within a finite configuration—
the history of metaphysics—and caught within a root system which does not end
there and which as yet has no name. (Derrida 1976, pp. 101–102)
And today we already see the emergence of new forms of nativisation: the being-(at-
home)-there with(in) social technology that belongs to what I am calling digital natives.
Increasingly, such natives no longer represent their roots as touching the soil of a definite
milieu. As Heidegger anticipated, the newly new social technologies have powers of tele-
mediatic delocalisation and virtualisation far beyond the old (generally national) forms.
However, this does not mean that we have to regard the ‘‘works’’ of digital natives as
fundamentally homeless, rootless and worldless, as Heidegger seems to have thought.
Indeed, more than ever, we can think of the new condition as a liberation from dangerous
fantasies of a pure ‘‘autochthonic’’ existence (Heidegger 1959, p. 48), and not from
nativisation as such, not from every ‘‘racinating function’’.
The internet is also showing potential for the formation of free groupings, self-curated
and roughly carved out spaces of what Wittgenstein had already called the globally
‘‘scattered’’ friends gathered by his writing (Wittgenstein 1980, p. 6). In this (virtualised
and indefinite) way of being-there and being-with perhaps, once more, a few ‘‘exalted
spirits who can fly off on their own’’ (Nietzsche 1973, p. 165) can emerge—but no longer
in the form of, for example, new regional or national figures, but what Nietzsche conceived
as a new ‘‘nomadic type of man’’ to come: individuals freed from dependence on a
‘‘definite milieu’’ and who would possess as a result the character of what are already
called ‘‘cosmopolitan plants’’, plants that can grow almost anywhere: individuals with ‘‘a
maximum of the art and power of adaptation’’ (Nietzsche 1973, p. 154).
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But there is a further attribute of this new type of creative ‘‘native’’—a type Nietzsche
baptised as the ‘‘good Europeans’’—that returns us rapidly to the theme of education for
children. Nietzsche characterises the new ‘‘type of man’’ in terms of individuals for whom
the call to self-responsibility is no longer ‘‘received almost as an offence’’ (Nietzsche 1973,
105); those who can best resist the temptation to immediately ‘‘shift off’’ responsibility on to
someone else (Nietzsche 1973, p. 33), and who, moreover, are capable of ‘‘extending’’ their
responsibility furthest (Nietzsche 1973, p. 124). Such people, these new European cos-
mopolitan plants, would thus ‘‘turn out [to be of a type] stronger and richer than has perhaps
ever happened before’’ (Nietzsche 1973, p. 124). It is profoundly significant, I believe, that
Nietzsche rests the success of this new development—the appearance of self-responsible
individuals with this ‘‘tremendous multiplicity practice, art and mask’’ (Nietzsche 1973,
p. 154)—on one principal factor: ‘‘the unprejudiced nature of his schooling’’ (Nietzsche
1973, p. 154). I will conclude with a brief consideration of this idea.
Poor and Vulgar Democrats
How to grow the plant ‘‘human being’’ in the technological age? Perhaps we now have the
outlines, at least, of an answer. In this essay we have come to see a surprisingly consistent
line of argument from Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Dewey and Nietzsche: the old school
system was fitted to the world of a self-sufficient farm economy that has been worn away
by globalising forces of tele-techno-mediatization and delocalisation. But the ‘‘progres-
sive’’ backlash against that school system risks the worst. By switching like a solenoid in
negating opposition to the old system, the progressives have introduced a new ‘‘fashion’’
for ‘‘enjoyable’’ schooling that threatens only slackness and irresponsibility. And in the
anonymity of masks that social technologies make available to digital natives today isn’t
this exactly what we see too often (but not always and everywhere) in today’s Twitter,
Facebook, SnapChat, Tumblr, Instagram, and so on. Even as it opens a space for a new
nativisation, thus far it seems to cultivate best a waste-land of self-indulgent, vulgar,
masked and de-responsibilised souls. I do not exclude myself. (Anxieties around this theme
are central to a rising number of texts, perhaps most on point and recent being Turkle
2015.)
More and more we do not count a school good if children don’t have a good time.
Calculative thinking in education today takes this as given, and is perhaps overwhelmed by
the difficulty of achieving that at the same time as achieving the calculable results that, in
its own accounting, actually count. Does Nietzsche’s reference to ‘‘unprejudiced school-
ing’’ direct thinking in a different direction? Derrida’s discussion of Nietzsche’s lectures
‘‘On the Future of our Educational Institutions’’ (1872) will bear more detailed attention
than I can give it here. However, it is interesting to note that Derrida highlights Nietzsche
placing special emphasis in those lectures on something Wittgenstein stressed too: ‘‘in-
struction by which the teacher must accustom his pupils to severe self-discipline in the
language’’, and contrasting this with teaching which proceeds ‘‘as if one had no obligation
to the present or the future of this language’’ (cited in Derrida 1985, p. 21). Derrida also
cites Nietzsche stressing that teaching intended to be enjoyable, agreeable and attuned to
the ‘‘inclinations and feelings of the young’’ is not the thing: ‘‘Bildung begins with obe-
dience [Gehorsamkeit], subordination [Unterordnung], discipline [Zucht] and subjection
[Dienstbarkeit] (cited in Derrida 1985, p. 28)
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We are not used to hearing this sort of idea anymore, except perhaps from militaristic
thugs and Nazis. And this is what really interests Derrida. Reading this controversial
Nietzschean text Derrida stresses that ‘‘it would be naive and crude’’ to read a Hitlerian or
Nazi resonance in it simply on the grounds of its appeal to the need for discipline and a
‘‘grosse Fu¨hrer’’ in teaching (Derrida 1985, p. 28). But he (Derrida) notes too that ‘‘one
may wonder why the only teaching institution or the only beginning of a teaching insti-
tution that ever succeeded in taking as its model the teaching of Nietzsche on teaching will
have been a Nazi one’’ (Derrida 1985, p. 24). The point, however, is not to find a way of
repudiating everything that might seem ‘‘scandalous to any contemporary anti-Nazi
democrat’’ (Derrida 1985, p. 24). Indeed, Derrida totally refuses to ‘‘neutralize or defuse
either what might be troublesome in it for democratic pedagogy or ‘leftist’ politics’’
(Derrida 1985, p. 23). Derrida does not want to make us (European democrats) comfort-
able here, admitting that even if Nazism ‘‘far from being the regeneration called for by
these lectures of 1872, were only a symptom of the accelerated decomposition of European
culture and society as diagnosed, it still remains to be explained how reactive degeneration
could exploit the same language, the same words, the same utterances, the same rallying
cries as the active forces to which it stands opposed’’ (Derrida 1985, p. 29).
I will come back to this shortly, but it is important first to see how Nietzsche’s affir-
mation of an education that cultivates self-discipline through obedience to a ‘‘Fu¨hrer’’
belongs intimately to his revolt against what he (Nietzsche) clearly conceives of as a
distinctively prejudiced education. Derrida summarises as follows:
When the lectures appear to recommend linguistic discipline as a counter to the kind
of ‘‘academic freedom’’ that leaves students and teachers free to their own thoughts
or programs, it is not in order to set constraint over against freedom. Behind ‘‘aca-
demic freedom’’ one can discern the silhouette of a constraint which is all the more
ferocious and implacable because it conceals and disguises itself in the form of
laissez-faire. Through the said ‘‘academic freedom,’’ it is the state that controls
everything… The lectures can thus be read as a modern critique of the cultural
machinery of state and of the educational system that was, even in yesterday’s
industrial society, a fundamental part of the state apparatus. If today such an appa-
ratus is on its way to being in part replaced by the media and in part associated with
them, this only makes Nietzsche’s critique of journalism—which he never dissoci-
ates from the educational apparatus—all the more striking. (Derrida 1985, pp. 33–34)
The ‘‘unprejudiced schooling’’ of the new ‘‘good European’’ will have, first of all,
disentangled itself from deformations of a narrowly nationalist milieu and world-horizon
fostered by the nation-state’s control of the school system. However, that state machine for
enculturation has for some time now lost the power to ‘‘control everything’’ in the
formation of its citizens’ world-horizon. As Heidegger also stresses, newspapers,
magazines, TV, and radio have, at least ‘‘in part’’, replaced it in that function, and no
doubt do so more and more today. There is, however, something even more striking
happening today: that ‘‘old media’’ is itself increasingly facing a challenge (if not
extinction) by ‘‘new media’’ outlets, and the seemingly endless proliferation of opinion and
comment beyond professional journalism. Perhaps there is a real kind of laissez-faire
developing here, but not one which typically serves self-responsible freedom: on the
contrary, it seems more and more only to cultivate freedom from responsibility, offering
confirmations and echo-chambers for any prejudice one finds agreeable, any ‘‘truth’’ one
‘‘likes’’.
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I don’t think Nietzsche conceived ‘‘unprejudiced schooling’’ as a formative encultur-
ation in a (someone’s) alternative ‘‘truth’’, a leftist or socialist one for example. Indeed, he
explicitly rejects the idea that it is a matter of ‘‘knowing correctly’’ at all. His emphasis,
like Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s and Dewey’s, is rather on an intergenerational handing
down, particularly with regard to language itself, ‘‘in which the pupil must learn to act
correctly’’ (cited in Derrida 1985, p. 22), learning thereby a form of self-discipline, or self-
mastery. Once more this would en-able ‘‘gifted youth’’ (Nietzsche), those children ‘‘with a
mind to do so’’ (Wittgenstein), with the being-able required to ‘‘mount from the depth of
his home ground up into the ether, into the open realm of the spirit’’ (Heidegger).
This call for a Bildung that begins with obedience, subordination, discipline and sub-
jection may be intended to cultivate ‘‘severe self-discipline’’ in a person’s use of language.
However, as I have indicated, as an educational policy proposal it runs up against the
understandable anxiety that, as Derrida notes, it uses the very same language, the very
same words as a call that would want, above all, to cultivate a passive and dependent type
of citizen—what Nietzsche will later call ‘‘weak-willed and highly employable workers
who need a master’’, or ‘‘a type prepared for slavery in the subtlest sense’’ (Nietzsche 1973,
p. 154). It is perhaps in view of this unsettling ambiguity of his own call that ‘‘Nietzsche
expressly said that he would not want to see the text [of the lectures on ‘‘The Future…’’]
published, even after his death. What is more, he interrupted the course of this discourse
along the way’’ (Derrida 1985, p. 24).
Nietzsche did not repudiate his thoughts on education but came to see them as an
‘‘exhortation’’, above all, to himself: ‘‘they call me to a duty and a task that are distinctly
incumbent upon me’’ (cited in Derrida 1985, p. 25).
Conclusion
How to educate oneself on the subject of the education of children? Are there ‘‘new
possibilities’’ of inheriting the task of ‘‘handing down the already spoken language’’ that
was so strenuously preserved in former times but which today—precisely because of the
way the task of handing down is being handed down today—leaves the field wide open to
its being used so ‘‘poorly and vulgarly’’ (cited in Derrida 1985, p. 21)? What we mean by
‘‘handing down’’ is at stake. Let’s not take for granted that we know what ‘‘Bildung’’
demands of us, or that the call for obedience, subordination, discipline and subjection can
only be thought symptomatically, that is to say, ‘‘poorly and vulgarly’’, out of the mouth of
a Nazi.
But we have to face the problem. The ‘‘home-ground’’ of the digital native is a radically
transformed one. The covert ‘‘controlling machinery’’ of horizon-formation that had been
the preserve of the state is increasingly being ‘‘replaced by the media’’, and today espe-
cially by ‘‘social media’’. This leaves today’s digital natives more vulnerable than ever. But
it does not make them fated or slated to ‘‘rootlessness’’. On the contrary, in the language
that has been handed down to us, it announces the possibility of a new nativisation with(in)
technology belonging to ‘‘a new nomadic kind of man’’. This condition, precisely because
of the ‘‘multiplicity of masks’’ it makes available, threatens profoundly to de-constrain us:
it is the perfect milieu for a kind of human being who indulges only in ‘‘doing what they
feel like doing’’ and who simply avoids all situations ‘‘which require effort and perse-
verance in overcoming obstacles.’’ Can education in the technological age prepare young
people to develop the ‘‘maximum of the art and power of adaptation’’ that social
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technology makes possible, or will it simply be the prep-school for ground-dwellers hiding
behind more or less anonymous and increasingly vulgar masks?
It seems abundantly clear that the task of rethinking education in the age of tele-techno-
mediatization and world-wide delocalisation has hardly begun. But we know already that
the thinking that has come down to us from the philosophers who champion self-re-
sponsibility above all stands for the ‘‘opposite’’ of what Nietzsche calls ‘‘the apostles of
‘modern ideas’’’ (Nietzsche 1973, p. 154) seem most to have cleaved to. For those apostles,
as Nietzsche stresses, ‘‘suffering itself they take for something that has to be abolished’’
(Nietzsche 1973, p. 54). Nietzsche too affirms that we are plants, and that the task of
cultivation of young plants has, in one crucial respect, not changed at all despite the loss of
the old rootedness: ‘‘We, who are the opposite of [these apostles of ‘modern ideas’], and
have opened our eyes and our conscience to the question where and how the plant ‘man’
has hitherto grown up most vigorously, we think that this has always happened under the
opposite conditions’’ (i.e. conditions opposite to those in which suffering is abolished)
(Nietzsche 1973, p. 54). Uncomfortable, untimely meditations. How shall we respond
today? As poor and vulgar democrats and dogmatic leftists who would prefer to impose
their supposedly unprejudiced ‘‘truth’’ on those with limited defences? As right-wing
fantasists of a pure autochthonic existence in a homeland? Or, for every teacher to find in
the desire for a history for all still to come, a call to self-responsibility, ‘‘a duty and a task
that are distinctly incumbent upon me [as a teacher]’’, to ‘‘awaken [my pupils] to the life of
the spirit, to the activity of thinking for themselves.’’
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